Practical private database queries based on a quantum key distribution
  protocol by Jakobi, Markus et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
2.
43
60
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  9
 Se
p 2
01
0
Practical private database queries based on a quantum key distribution protocol
Markus Jakobi1,2, Christoph Simon1,3, Nicolas Gisin1, Jean-Daniel
Bancal1, Cyril Branciard1, Nino Walenta1, and Hugo Zbinden1
1 Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
2 Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, D-10117 Berlin, Germany
3 Institute for Quantum Information Science and Department of Physics and Astronomy,
University of Calgary, Calgary T2N 1N4, Alberta, Canada
(Dated: September 20, 2018)
Private queries allow a user Alice to learn an element of a database held by a provider Bob
without revealing which element she was interested in, while limiting her information about the
other elements. We propose to implement private queries based on a quantum key distribution
protocol, with changes only in the classical post-processing of the key. This approach makes our
scheme both easy to implement and loss-tolerant. While unconditionally secure private queries are
known to be impossible, we argue that an interesting degree of security can be achieved, relying on
fundamental physical principles instead of unverifiable security assumptions in order to protect both
user and database. We think that there is scope for such practical private queries to become another
remarkable application of quantum information in the footsteps of quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
As telecommunication gains steadily in importance,
questions of security and privacy naturally arise. Indeed,
private data is stored on a grand scale and has become a
precious commodity. Unfortunately, as a matter of prin-
ciple classical information theory is not able to secure
privacy in telecommunication against an unlimited ad-
versary. It was hence found all the more extraordinary
that quantum key distribution (QKD) allows such “un-
conditionally” private communication, provided that the
two parties trust each other. However, the more general
case of communication between distrustful parties, who
not only wish to protect their common privacy against
eavesdropping, but also their individual privacy against
each other, is maybe of even greater interest.
Private queries are an important problem of this type.
Imagine that a user, Alice, wants to know an element of a
database held by a database provider, Bob, but does not
want him to know which element she is interested in. Bob
in turn wants to limit the amount of information that she
can gain about the database. In particular, he does not
want to just hand over the whole database, which would
trivially allow Alice to learn her bit of interest without
giving any information on her choice away. It is not hard
to imagine scenarios (e.g. in the financial world) where
the capability of implementing such private queries would
be useful. The information stored in the database may
be both valuable and sensitive, such that Bob would like
to sell it piece by piece, whereas the mere fact of being
interested in an element of the database might already
reveal something important about Alice (e.g. that she is
thinking about buying a certain company). Of course if
there was a cheap way of realizing the task, it would also
be interesting for protecting privacy in online bargaining
and web search, for example, as well as to construct other
interesting cryptographic primitives from it [1].
The described task is also known as symmetrically pri-
vate information retrieval and as 1 out of N oblivious
transfer [2]. It has attracted much attention both in com-
puter science [3, 4] and in quantum information. Clas-
sically, the problem seems like a logical contradiction.
How could a database provider answer a question, which
he is not supposed to know, without giving any addi-
tional information? One might hope that quantum me-
chanics could solve this dilemma. Several quantum pro-
tocols were proposed, see for example Refs. [5, 6], none
of which were found to offer complete protection for both
sides. Indeed, it was subsequently proven in Ref. [7] that
the described task can not be implemented ideally, not
even using quantum physics. The essential assumption
in the impossibility proof is that the protocol is perfectly
concealing, i.e. that Bob has no information whatso-
ever about which database element Alice has retrieved.
Rephrased at the quantum level this is understood as
the condition that the density matrix of Bob’s subsys-
tem must be completely independent of Alice’s choice.
Ref. [7] shows that under this condition Alice can always
implement an attack based on the Schmidt decomposi-
tion which allows her to read the entire database. This
argument is closely linked to the well-known impossibility
proofs for quantum bit commitment [8, 9].
Recently, Giovannetti, Lloyd and Maccone [10] pointed
out that very interesting degrees of privacy are achievable
for protocols that are not perfectly concealing, because
of the possibility to catch dishonest parties due to the
errors they introduce, see also [11–13]. In the protocol of
Ref. [10] Alice encodes her question in a quantum state,
which she sends to Bob. She also sends a decoy state,
which gives her a chance to detect if Bob is cheating.
The security relies on the impossibility to perfectly dis-
criminate the non-orthogonal question and decoy states,
2and on the changes Bob’s measurement will introduce as
a consequence. Unfortunately the protocol is very vul-
nerable in realistic situations where there are significant
transmission losses, such that Alice has to send the same
question multiple times. If some of the losses are in fact
due to Bob tapping the line, then he can learn Alice’s
question without being detected.
II. CLAIM
In this paper we present a new approach to the private
query problem. Our protocol is explicitly not perfectly
concealing in the above sense, so that the impossibility
proof of Ref. [7] does not apply. We show that the fol-
lowing statements hold for our protocol.
(1) Database security is very good. Even for relevant
multi-qubit joint measurements Alice’s accessible in-
formation is restricted to a well-defined small per-
centage of the database elements. The concrete lim-
its for different attacks are shown in the security
discussion. Moreover the additional elements Alice
learns are randomly distributed over the database
and therefore of little use to her. In general, database
security is ensured by the impossibility of perfectly
distinguishing non-orthogonal quantum states.
(2) User privacy is also very high. We study several nat-
ural attacks and derive a simple limit on the infor-
mation Bob can obtain. In general, we show that the
no-signaling principle implies that every malicious ac-
tion of Bob will introduce errors and can hence be
detected by Alice - systematic cheating is impossible.
The protocol relies on QKD with changes only in the
post-processing and can hence profit from many of the
advantages of this well understood and commercially
available technology. In comparison to Ref. [10] it of-
fers the advantage of practical feasibility, in particular
loss-tolerance and scalability to large databases.
Note that the incorporation of security assumptions
such as the bounded storage model [14] could make the
protocol completely secure, under the condition that
those assumptions are fulfilled. However, even in the
absence of such assumptions, our protocol’s basic secu-
rity is guaranteed by fundamental physical principles,
namely the impossibility of perfectly discriminating non-
orthogonal quantum states and the impossibility of su-
perluminal communication.
It should be underlined that we do not propose an
ideal cryptographic primitive, which would furthermore
allow one to construct other ideal cryptographic prim-
itives such as user identification, bit commitment and
coin flipping [1], but a new practical and potentially very
useful application of quantum communication.
Our protocol is similar to the proposal of Bennett,
Brassard, Cre´peau and Skubiszewska [5], which can be
interpreted to rely on BB84 QKD [15]. It is well known
that the proposal of Ref. [5] is susceptible to a quantum
memory attack by the user, which corrupts database se-
curity entirely. The crucial point is that [5] is perfectly
concealing, hence Lo’s impossibility proof [7] implies that
the user can learn the entire database - in this case with
the help of a quantum memory. We show that this type
of attack can be forestalled by using the SARG04 QKD
scheme [16] instead of BB84. Then user privacy is slightly
weakened, but the quantum memory attack is no longer
feasible. Moreover the errors a cheating provider intro-
duces largely guarantee user privacy.
III. APPROACH
In order to better understand our approach it is very
useful to compare it to QKD. In general QKD consists
of a first phase, where a large number of quantum states
are prepared, exchanged and measured, and then a sec-
ond phase, where Alice and Bob extract a key from the
quantum communication part with the help of an a pri-
ori chosen coding and interpretation process. The key
is then known to both Alice and Bob entirely and can
be used to encrypt the actual message, which is sent via
a classical channel. The quantum states and the post-
processing procedure are chosen such that the key can
not be eavesdropped on without introducing errors, thus
protecting Alice’s and Bob’s common privacy.
The basic idea of our protocol is to use QKD in com-
bination with adequate post-processing to generate an
N -bit string Kf that will serve as an oblivious key [17]
for a database of N bits. For this purpose, Kf must be
distributed in such a way that (1) Bob knows the key
entirely, (2) Alice knows only a few bits of Kf - ideally
exactly one (database security), and (3) Bob does not
know which bits are known to Alice (user privacy). In
order to use Kf to encrypt the database, Bob adds key
and database bit-wise with a relative shift chosen by Al-
ice and sends her the encrypted database. The relative
shift is needed in order to ensure that Alice’s bit of inter-
est is encoded with an element of Kf she knows, so that
she can decipher the bit and thus receive the answer to
her private query.
Within our approach, the case of Alice knowing ex-
actly one bit cannot be realized deterministically. So in
general Alice will know a few bits of Kf , which means
that database privacy is good but not perfect. As the
number of Alice’s elements is Poisson-distributed, there
is also a small probability of Alice having no bit in the
end. The protocol then needs to be repeated. This can
be done without loss of privacy for either party : The cre-
ated string Kf does not contain any information on the
database, so database security is not touched, and like-
3wise the shift (which maps Alice’s known key element
onto the database element she needs) is only communi-
cated once a correct key has been established. Of course,
Alice could claim to have obtained no element of Kf
with the hope of having more elements after a repetition.
However, this strategy can be made ineffective by choos-
ing the parameters of the protocol such as to make the
case of Alice having no element very unlikely, cf. also
section V.
As already mentioned, the generation of Kf can be
based on QKD techniques. Consider for instance 4-state-
BB84-type QKD. After Bob has sent the states (without
further information), Alice, choosing measurement bases
at random, will measure half of the bits she receives in
the correct basis - without yet knowing for which ones her
choice was correct. When Bob subsequently announces
the bases, we have the situation that (I) Bob knows the
entire “raw key”, (II) Alice knows half of the bits and
(III) Bob can not know which ones Alice has measured
correctly. Alice’s limited information on the raw key can
now be further diluted by adequate processing in order
to generate the oblivious key Kf , and this is indeed the
way Ref. [5] essentially works. However, if Alice has a
quantum memory this protocol is no longer secure. She
can then store the received states and postpone all mea-
surements until after Bob’s announcement. By doing so,
she can learn Kf entirely - there is hence actually no
database security at all.
Fortunately this attack can be largely forestalled rather
easily if one uses a SARG-QKD scheme instead of BB84.
SARG04 uses the same states as 4-state-BB84. The main
difference lies in the attribution of bit values to the quan-
tum states. Whereas in BB84 one state from each of the
two bases codes for 0, the other one for 1, in SARG04
it is the basis itself that codes for the bit value. I.e., if
Bob sends a state in the “up-down” basis l this signifies
a 0, and a state from the “left-right” basis ↔ means 1.
During the post-processing Bob does not announce which
basis he has used for each qubit. Instead Bob announces
the state he has sent plus one state from the other basis
(in random order). Alice is thus faced with a state dis-
crimination problem that can not be solved perfectly, i.e.
unambiguously and deterministically at the same time.
This slight change has profound implications for SARG04
QKD [18]. Here we show that it is also very useful for
implementing private queries. A simple protocol based
on this approach consists of the following steps.
IV. PROTOCOL
1. Bob sends a long random sequence of qubits (e.g. pho-
tons) in states |↑〉, |→〉, |↓〉 and |←〉. States |↑〉 and
|↓〉 code for 0, |←〉 and |→〉 correspond to bit value 1.
For instance, to send a bit 1 Bob can prepare a qubit
in the state |→〉.
FIG. 1: How to reduce Alice’s information: her information
on a sum string is lower than that on the initial strings. Ques-
tion marks symbolize bits whose value is unknown to Alice.
2. Alice measures each state in l or ↔ basis at random.
This alone does not allow her to infer the sent bit
value.
3. Alice announces in which instances she has success-
fully detected the qubit; lost or not detected photons
are disregarded. The possibility to discard bits does
not allow Alice to cheat, because after step 2 she still
has no information whatsoever on the sent bit values,
cf. step 5. As a consequence, the protocol is com-
pletely loss-independent.
4. For each qubit that Alice has successfully measured,
Bob announces a pair of two states: the one that has
actually been sent and one from the other basis, so
{|↑〉 , |→〉}, {|→〉 , |↓〉}, {|↓〉 , |←〉} or {|←〉 , |↑〉}. If
|→〉 has been sent, Bob could announce for instance
{|↑〉 , |→〉}. This is exactly as in the SARG04 QKD
protocol [16].
5. Alice interprets her measurement results of step 4. De-
pending on which basis she has chosen and which re-
sult she has obtained she will be able to decipher the
sent bit value or not. For instance, if |→〉 has been sent
and {|↑〉 , |→〉} was announced, Alice can rule out |↑〉
only if she has measured in the l basis and obtained
the result |↓〉. She can then conclude that the state
was |→〉 and the bit value is 1. Direct measurement
as under step 2 will yield 1/4 of conclusive results and
3/4 of inconclusive ones. Both conclusive and incon-
clusive results are kept. Alice and Bob now share a
string which is known entirely to Bob and in a quarter
to Alice.
6. The created string must be of length k × N (with k
a security parameter). It is cut into k substrings of
length N . These strings are added bitwise in order
to reduce Alice information on the key to roughly one
bit, cf. Fig. 1.
7. If Alice is left with no known bit after step 6, the
protocol has to be restarted. The probability for this
to occur can be kept small. See also the discussion in
the previous and following sections.
48. IfKf has been established correctly, Alice will know at
least one element of it. Suppose she knows the jth bit
Kfj and wants the i
th bit of the database Xi. She then
announces the number s = j− i in order to allow Bob
to encode the database by bitwise adding Kf , shifted
by s. So Bob announces N bits Cn = Xn ⊕ Kfn+s
where Alice can read Ci = Xi ⊕Kfj and thus obtain
Xi. The shift will hence make sure that Alice’s bit of
interest is coded with a key element she knows so that
the private query can be completed.
V. DISCUSSION
Steps 1 to 5 of the above protocol are completely iden-
tical to SARG04 QKD with the only difference that every
bit is kept, regardless if it is conclusive or not for Alice.
SARG04 was initially conceived to make QKD more re-
sistant to photon number splitting attacks when weak
pulses are used instead of single photons for the sake of
practical feasibility. In our case the use of SARG04 does
not only provide us with the benefits of loss-tolerance,
technological practicability and conceptual closeness to
well-understood QKD, but it also prevents the quantum
memory attack that destroyed the security of the pro-
tocol of Ref. [5]. Even using a quantum memory Alice
is always confronted with the problem of discriminating
two non-orthogonal quantum states, and will hence al-
ways have incomplete knowledge on the raw key. This
lack of information is subsequently further amplified by
step 6.
Note that following the ”honest” way of measuring and
interpreting her results Alice will also gain probabilistic
information on non-conclusive bits. If Alice obtains no
result it is with probability 2/3 because she has chosen
the same basis for measurement as Bob has chosen for
state preparation (which will never yield a conclusive re-
sult). Considering the example of step 5, Alice can obtain
the result |→〉 when measuring in↔ both if Bob sent |→〉
(then with probability 1) and if Bob sent |↑〉 (then with
probability 1/2 only). So, although |→〉 is not a conclu-
sive result, Alice can infer that the sent state was |→〉
(bit 1) with probability 2/3 and |↑〉 (bit 0) with proba-
bility 1/3. This additional information can be diluted to
a negligible level by the post-processing of step 6.
After creation of the raw key of k ×N bits, the string
is divided into k substrings of length N . Following the
protocol, after adding the substrings, Alice will on av-
erage know n¯ = N(1
4
)k bits, where the number n fol-
lows approximately a Poisson distribution. On the other
hand, the probability P0 that she does not know any
bits at all and that the protocol must be restarted, is
P0 =
(
1− ( 1
4
)k)N ≈ e−n¯. For large N , which is the
most interesting case in practice, it is therefore possi-
ble to ensure both n¯ ≪ N and small P0 by choosing an
TABLE I: Example of possible choices of k for different
database sizes N . We show the failure probability P0 and
the expected number of elements n¯ an honest Alice will ob-
tain.
N 103 5× 103 104 5× 104 105 106
k 4 5 6 7 7 9
P0 0.020 0.008 0.087 0.047 0.002 0.022
n¯ 3.91 4.88 2.44 3.05 6.10 3.81
appropriate value of k. For instance, for a database of
N = 50000 elements k = 7 is a choice providing Alice
with n¯ ≈ 3 elements of the final key on average whereas
the probability of failure is only about 5%, see also Tab.
I. The case of many repetitions (which might allow Alice
to wait until she obtains a large value of n by chance)
is hence very unlikely. This is important for the proto-
col’s security. Since the states sent by Bob do not contain
any information about the database, and since Alice only
chooses and communicates the shift s to Bob once she
knows at least one bit of the final key, a few repetitions
will not compromise anybody’s security. Note that even
if Alice knows n > 1 bits of the oblivious key, she has to
pick a single shift s, which means that in general she can
only learn one chosen element of the database, since the
other n−1 bits known to her will be at random positions
in the key and thus in the database.
However, the fact that Alice normally obtains addi-
tional, less interesting bits should not be seen only as a
drawback of the protocol, as it also offers an interesting
possibility to enhance her security: Alice can buy the
extra bits in question publicly (as opposed to privately),
in order to compare them with Bob’s answers. As ex-
plained in detail in the security section, a cheating Bob
will always lose knowledge on Kf . The errors he thus
introduces will then be detectable for Alice. This way
what seems to be a flaw in the protocol can be used to
strengthen user privacy.
VI. SECURITY
We now turn to the question of which degree of privacy
our protocol offers precisely. We study the most evident
attacks and clarify the way in which two fundamental
physical principles provide the basis for the protocol’s
security. While basic attacks are studied and the essential
intuition is given, a complete security analysis remains
work for the future.
A. Database security
Let us first discuss database security. In general one
must assume that Alice disposes of a quantum mem-
51 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
combined qubits
Up
pe
r B
ou
nd
 o
n 
US
D
FIG. 2: The upper bound on the success probability of the
joint unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurement
on k qubits declines rapidly with k.
ory and is hence not forced to measure directly as in
step 2. Instead she can keep the photon and, once Bob
has announced the state pair, apply the optimal unam-
biguous state discrimination measurement [19, 20] that
will correctly tell her which of the two announced states
has actually been sent. The success probability of USD
is, for the case of two equally likely states, bounded by
1 − F (ρ0, ρ1) where F (ρ0, ρ1) is the fidelity between the
two quantum states one seeks to discriminate. Here, Al-
ice’s measurement will hence only work with a success
probability of 1 − |〈↑| →〉| = 1 − 1/√2 ≈ 0.29, only
slightly more than the 0.25 of the direct measurement.
In the above example with N = 50000 and k = 7 this
will provide her with n¯ = 9.3 elements on average - only
a small gain compared to n¯ = 3 and very little in rela-
tion to N = 50000 for such a complex attack. So even
using a quantum memory, individual measurements will
not substantially increase her information on Kf . The
reason for this is precisely the fact that our protocol is
based on SARG04 rather than on BB84 coding.
A more general attack is to store the received pho-
tons in a quantum memory and to postpone all mea-
surements until the very end of the protocol after step
6, so that she knows which k qubits contribute to an
element of the final key. The individual bit values of
the raw key are actually of no interest for her. So, in-
stead of performing the optimal individual measurement
on each of the k qubits constituting an element of Kf ,
Alice should perform a joint measurement. An example
for this is Helstrom’s minimal error-probability measure-
ment, i.e. the measurement that distinguishes two quan-
tum states with the highest information gain [21, 22]. In
the case of two equally likely quantum states ρ0 and ρ1
the probability to guess the state at hand correctly is
bounded by Pguess =
1
2
+
1
2
D(ρ0, ρ1), where D(ρ0, ρ1)
is the trace distance. For a joint Helstrom measurement
on a bit of Kf one finds this probability to scale with
the number k of added qubits as Pguess =
1
2
+
1
2
√
2k
.
So the more substrings are added to generate the final
key, the harder it is for her to guess the bit value, i.e.
the parity of the k qubits. For example, for k = 7 Alice
will guess a key element correctly with 54.4% instead of
50% for a random guess. Likewise, the success proba-
bility of unambiguously discriminating the two k-qubit
mixed states corresponding to odd and even parity de-
clines rapidly with the number of qubits k, see Fig. 2.
In conclusion, it is clear that the impossibility to perfectly
distinguish non-orthogonal quantum states can effectively
protect the database’s security and prevent Alice from
knowing a substantial part of it, even when she uses per-
fect storage technology and realizes the theoretically op-
timal joint measurements. We see that incorporating a
SARG04 state discrimination problem as vital part of the
protocol, the Schmidt attack of Lo’s impossibility proof
can be averted. The price to pay is a protection of the
user that is not total. We now turn to the question of
user privacy.
B. User privacy
As we have discussed above, a not perfectly concealing
protocol, i.e. a protocol where Bob can gain some infor-
mation on Alice’s choice, is the prerequisite to prevent
her from being able to compromise database security en-
tirely [7]. For the given protocol it may not be obvious
at first sight how Bob can access information on Alice’s
choice, in the absence of any classical or quantum com-
munication from her to him. It turns out that he can
indeed gather information on a bit’s conclusiveness, and
hence infer if that particular bit is more or less likely to
be a key element Alice knows.
The simplest attack for Bob is to send other states
than he announces, for instance a state |ր〉 that is ex-
actly intermediate between |↑〉 and |→〉, while announc-
ing a pair {|↑〉 , |→〉}. Alice’s probabilities to measure
|↓〉 or |←〉 are largely reduced. Indeed, she will find a
probability of only 14.64% to have such a conclusive re-
sult. Likewise sending the state |ւ〉 (orthogonal to |ր〉)
while announcing {|↑〉 , |→〉} will raise the probability to
interpret the result as conclusive to 85.36%. Bob can
thus bias the probability of conclusive results for Alice
continuously between the above limits. However, every
such attack will introduce errors, as Bob cannot predict
her outcome with certainty. In the example above, Alice
registering |↓〉 and |←〉, i.e. both bit values, are equally
likely events, and Bob’s bit error rate will therefore be
as high as 50%. This evident example shows that Bob
can gain information on the conclusiveness of Alice’s bits
but will then lose information on the bit values she has
recorded.
The presented attack is closely related to an attack
that uses entanglement. Bob prepares a state of two
qubits
1√
2
{|↑〉A |R0〉B + |→〉A |R1〉B}, where the first
qubit is sent to Alice and the second is kept in Bob’s reg-
6ister (with 〈R0 |R1〉B = 0). Bob announces having sent
|↑〉 or |→〉. Once Alice has successfully measured and ac-
cepted her qubit, Bob can decide if he wants to measure
honestly, i.e. recover the sent bit value, or gain some in-
formation on the conclusiveness of Alice’s measurement.
In order to proceed honestly Bob measures his register in
the basis {|R0〉 , |R1〉}, which tells him which of the two
announced states has actually been sent [23]. He then
knows which bit value Alice will record in case of a con-
clusive outcome, but has gained no improved estimation
of the likelihood for this to happen. In contrast, mea-
suring in the {(|R0〉+ |R1〉)/
√
2, (|R0〉− |R1〉)/
√
2} basis
provides him with likelihood information on the conclu-
siveness of a bit, but clearly yields no information at all
on the sent bit value.
This second measurement can also be seen from an-
other angle. If Alice has obtained a conclusive re-
sult (probability 1/4) Bob’s register is in a state ρc =(
1/2 0
0 1/2
)
, if Alice measurement was non-conclusive
(probability 3/4) he has ρn =
(
1/2
√
2/3√
2/3 1/2
)
. As
ρc 6= ρn the protocol is not perfectly concealing. Us-
ing the criteria of Refs. [19, 20] one can show that these
two density matrices cannot be discriminated unambigu-
ously for the single-qubit case. The best chance to guess
the state correctly is 85.36%, as for the previous attack.
The second given measurement basis does indeed consti-
tute Helstrom’s minimal error probability measurement
[21, 22] for the conclusiveness of one of Alice’s bits. As
a matter of fact, one can show that, given an arbitrary
mixed qubit state, the likelihood to measure a conclusive
result will be confined by the very same bounds (85.36%
and 14.64%). No qubit state can only yield conclusive
results upon the above measurement, or only yield in-
conclusive results. This individual attack is therefore
optimal, yields information on the bit’s conclusiveness,
and completely erases the bit value information from
Bob’s register. This last point means that Bob will not
know Kf correctly - a cheating Bob can then be caught
when providing wrong answers [12]. In principle these re-
sults can be generalized to joint measurements on several
qubits, however, these complicated attacks are beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead we will now clarify the
conceptual reason why it is impossible for Bob to have
both the correct bit value and conclusiveness informa-
tion.
Let us suppose that Bob can gain information on the
conclusiveness of one of Alice’s elements of the raw key,
either by construction of the sent state, or by some mea-
surement performed on his register at the end of the pro-
tocol. Let us characterize this information by pc, the
probability with which Bob correctly guesses that Alice
has a conclusive result. (Remember that this likelihood
is physically bounded by 0.1464 ≤ pc ≤ 0.8536 if a single
qubit is sent.) Let us also assume that, either by con-
struction of the state or by some second measurement,
Bob can also guess the bit value b Alice has recorded (if
her measurement was conclusive) and is correct about
it with the probability pb. Recalling the way Alice in-
terprets her measurement results in step 5 of the pro-
tocol, it is clear that, if Bob correctly guesses that Al-
ice’s result was indeed conclusive and correctly guesses
which bit value she has obtained, then he also correctly
guesses which measurement basis she has used for this
qubit in step 2. However, since there is no communica-
tion whatsoever from Alice to Bob about her choice of
basis, the no-signaling principle dictates that his proba-
bility to guess her basis correctly has to be equal to 1/2.
Otherwise the procedure would allow Alice to send sig-
nals to Bob that are faster than the speed of light. This
immediately implies the bound
pc × pb ≤ 1/2.
The inequality arises because even for inconclusive results
Bob has a chance to guess Alice’s basis correctly. This
simple upper bound illustrates the crucial point: When-
ever Bob tries to alter the conclusiveness probability of
certain bits in order to better judge which bits of Kf are
(un)known to Alice, he will necessarily lose information
on the bit value Alice records, in order to comply with
the no-signaling principle. This introduces errors in Kf
and hence also in the encrypted database, i.e. he will run
the risk of giving wrong answers.
This shows that our protocol is cheat-sensitive in the
spirit of Refs. [10, 12]. In our scenario, Bob sells his
database bit by bit. Systematic cheating and hence giv-
ing wrong answers will ruin his reputation as a database
provider. As we already mentioned above, one can now
even make use of the fact that Alice normally obtains
additional database elements. If she buys those elements
from Bob in a regular, non-private way, she can use them
to check Bob’s honesty [24]. By doing so, Alice has a pow-
erful prompt privacy check at hand. One can thus turn
what seems a flaw into an advantage, in order to make
full use of the privacy, which, as we have seen, is guaran-
teed by the impossibility of superluminal communication
in quantum physics.
VII. OUTLOOK & CONCLUSIONS
The above discussion has shown that practically very
interesting levels of privacy in database queries can
be achieved for both sides. The security of the pre-
sented protocol relies on fundamental physical principles
(the impossibility to deterministically discriminate non-
orthogonal states, and the impossibility of superluminal
communication), rather than on assumptions on quan-
tum storage limitations [14], mathematical complexity
7[3] or non-communication between severs in multi-server
protocols [4].
We have already emphasized that the protocol is com-
pletely loss-resistant. We believe that error correction is
possible as well. This requires additional classical two-
way communication and still needs to be elaborated in
more detail. Moreover, it is clear that the protocol can
be implemented with weak coherent pulses as well. The
acceptable amount of loss then depends on the mean pho-
ton number per pulse, in order to safeguard database se-
curity. High mean photon numbers largely facilitate un-
ambiguous state discrimination for Alice, if one assumes
that she is in control of the transmission line. Finally, it
is possible to improve database security by more sophis-
ticated post-processing, e.g. by taking a couple of strings
created in our probabilistic protocol (with P0 ≪ 1) and
allowing Alice to combine them, i.e. to freely choose rel-
ative shifts to add them bitwise. Simulations show that
she will be left with knowing exactly one bit of the final
key with overwhelming probability. Both error correction
and the described way of achieving tighter database secu-
rity complicate the security analysis due to the necessary
two-way communication.
The proposed protocol can be realized with any ex-
isting QKD system that is compatible with the SARG04
protocol. Besides ensuring loss tolerance, this also makes
it easy to scale up to large databases. We hope that our
proposal will stimulate further work to clarify the open
questions. Besides a more in-depth study of its secu-
rity, these include the optimal classical procedures for
oblivious key generation and error correction. We think
that there is the potential for private queries to become a
genuine application of quantum information technology
in the footsteps of QKD.
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